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In this article we examine processes of ethical deliberation, legislative developments, 
and social and political factors that have contributed to the emergence of human 
embryo gene editing as a field of life science research in China. For this purpose, we 
examine conceptions of the legal status of the human embryo in three domains of 
China’s legal system: in patent law, in the jurisdictional domain of birth control, and 
in civil law. Each of these legal domains handles a different conception of the human 
embryo’s moral and legal status, and in all three the embryo’s status is contested and 
subject to changes. Our findings suggest that definitions of the legal status of the 
human embryo in China are at present in the midst of a renegotiation progress, which 
is driven by a variety of developments and causes. In this paper, we focus on three 
types of controversies that underlie this renegotiation process and we illustrate the 
conflicting aspirations, ethical arguments and moral priorities that inform these 
conflicts. We end this article with three lines of consideration that might structure 
future studies on this issue. 
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The genetic modification of human embryos is an ongoing and seemingly unstoppable 
development. Just days after a group of US researchers published a “warning” in the 
journal Nature on 12 March 2015, entitled “Don’t edit the human germ line” 
(Lanphier 2015), Chinese scientists reported the first-ever experiment of gene editing 
in human embryos, in research linked to the blood disease beta-thalassemia (Liang et 
al. 2015). The team used the CRISPR/Cas9 system, a molecular technology that 
allows one to scan, splice and cut the genome of living cells and to “edit” (or re-write) 
it’s DNA (Mans et al. 2015). Clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic 
repeats (CRISPR) technology is widely recognised as a “game changer” in life and 
health sciences because it allows fast, cheap and increasingly effective forms of 
genetic modification in living species, for a multiplicity of applications (Ledford 
2015). Even though the Chinese researchers used tripronuclear zygotes (Liang et al. 
2015),2 which are unable to develop into a human being, the first report of human 
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2 Tripronuclear (3PN) zygotes result from fertilization of two sperms and one egg. Since tripronuclear 
zygotes lose the ability to reproduce as it contains 3 sets of chromosomes, Liang et al. (2015) argued 
that the use of these zygotes for research purposes is permissible from an ethical perspective. 
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embryo gene editing (HEGE) resulted in an outcry of public concern and fierce 
ethical debate (Bosley et al 2015). It is noteworthy, however, that the conclusions of 
the Chinese publication discouraged human gene editing in clinical applications by 
pointing to notable off-target effects, unwanted mutations and a low efficiency of 
homologous recombination directed repair (Liang et al. 2015). Based on these results, 
Xiaoxue Zhang, the managing editor of the journal Protein and Cell in which the 
article was published concluded, that any clinical use should be postponed until these 
problems are solved, and then proceed under strict regulatory oversight (Zhang 2015). 
Despite these words of caution, many commentators fiercely criticized this 
study, with some claiming a clear ethical dividing line between China and “the West”. 
According to New York Times reporter Didi K. Tatlow, for instance,  “scientists in the 
west generally abjure this sort of research on the grounds that it amounts to genetic 
engineering of humans” (Tatlow 2015). Tetsuya Ishii, a bioethicist from Hokkaido 
University in Japan, argued in a similar vein. According to Ishii, China has a 
reputation for sometimes moving fast in the life and health sciences, and ignoring 
important ethical considerations in the process (Cyranoski 2015). A similar argument 
has been made by George Q. Daley, a stem cell scientist from Harvard Medical 
School, who suggested that lax jurisdictions might give rise to forms of 
experimentation regardless of the ethical and clinical problems (Vincent 2015). Most 
of these critics have claimed that the regulatory framework for human germ line 
editing is too liberal and insufficiently developed in China, and that as a result 
Chinese researchers are able to cross ethical boundaries that scientists in other 
scientifically advanced countries were not allowed to cross.  
On the other hand, Chinese bioethicists and scientists have argued that there is 
no ethical or regulatory divide between China and Western countries in the human 
embryo gene-editing field. Zhai, Ng and Lie, for instance have suggested that many of 
the critical reactions among international commentators are based on 
misunderstandings and a “lack of willingness to acknowledge China as an equal 
partner in the international debate about proper limits to the development of new 
biotechnologies” (Zhai, Ng and Lie 2016). According to these authors, China has a 
well-developed regulatory framework for the governing of human germ line gene 
editing that is comparable to that of many developed countries. Regulatory 
instruments, as Zhai, Ng and Lie point out, include procedures for the management of 
human genetic resources issued by the National Health and Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC), ethical principles for the governance of artificial reproductive 
technology (also by the NHFPC), good clinical practice standards from the China 
Food and Drug Administration (CFDA), and a regulation for the ethical review of 
biomedical research involving human subjects (Zhai, Ng and Lie 2016). These 
regulatory instruments require institutional review board (IRB) review for all forms of 
genetics research, and state that the collection, storage and use of human embryos, 
gametes and other genetic materials must “abide to the principles of autonomy and 
informed consent” (Zhai, Ng and Lie 2016). Most importantly, even though the use of 
embryo gene editing in basic and preclinical research is not prohibited in itself, the 
use of genetically modified gametes or embryos for clinical or reproductive purposes 
is explicitly banned (as laid down in the 2003 Technical Norms on Human Assisted 
Reproduction, issued by the NHFPC) (Zhai, Ng and Lie 2016).3 
                                                        
3 It is relevant to point out in this regard that the Chinese Health and Family Planning Commission 
(which is the former Ministry of Health) and the China Food and Drug Administration have in 2009, 
2012 and 2015 also introduced guidelines for stem cell therapies. In theory, these regulatory 
instruments also affect the clinical use of genetically modified embryos or gametes, at least a later 
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Conceptions of an ethical rift between China and other scientifically advanced 
countries are also contradicted by various recent developments. Permissions for the 
genetic editing of human embryos have in the meantime also been granted in the 
United Kingdom (Francis Crick Institute 2016), in Sweden (Callaway 2016) and the 
USA (Servick 2017). In contrast to the first study in China, which worked with 
embryos that were not viable for reproduction, the Swedish team uses completely 
healthy embryos that are able to develop to human offspring (Stein 2016). Moreover, 
calls for a global temporary moratorium on human germ line editing were rejected in 
an international summit on human gene editing that was coordinated by the US 
National Academy of the Sciences, in collaboration with the UK Royal Academy and 
the Chinese Academy of the Sciences in December 2015 (LaBarbera 2016). This 
meeting concluded that basic and preclinical research on human embryo and germ 
line gene editing should be allowed. The clinical use of human germ line editing, 
though, should be temporarily suspended until related safety and efficacy issues have 
been resolved (LaBarbera 2016).  
 In this paper, we set out to examine processes of ethical deliberation, 
legislative developments, and a variety of social and political factors that have 
contributed to the emergence of human embryo gene editing as a field of life science 
research in China. For this purpose we focus on three legal domains of China’s legal 
system: patent law, the jurisdictional domain of birth control, and civil law. Each of 
these legal domains handles a different conception of the embryo’s moral and legal 
status, and especially in civil law and patent law these definitions have been subject to 
contestation and ongoing transformation. In patent law, owing to the law’s definition 
of the embryo’s moral status, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes are excluded from patentability. This has resulted in the prohibition to patent 
human embryonic stem cells (hESC) and other inventions as well as biological 
derivates that include human embryos or gametes. In the legal domain of birth control, 
on the other hand, unborn human life has since the early 1980s gradually been de-
humanized and been categorized as a form of (disposable) biological material, similar 
to blood or other human tissues. In civil law, finally, definitions of the legal status of 
human embryos are only gradually emerging. In China’s first frozen embryo 
inheritance case in 2009, the embryo’s legal status was defined as an “ethical object” 
(伦理物), which requires a higher level of moral respect than a common object, but 
which is not ascribed the same level of legal protection as a human being. These 
findings suggest that definitions of the legal status of the human embryo in China are 
at present in the midst of an ongoing renegotiation progress and subject to continuing 
changes. We will illustrate these debates and ongoing transformations in the empirical 
part of this paper, which follows the introduction. Then, in the discussion part of this 
paper we will reflect on the main factors that influence this negotiation process. We 
will show that at the heart of this dynamic is a clash between contrasting moral 
arguments and aspirations, which prioritize the realization of collective benefits for 
Chinese society, on the one hand, and the protection of the rights of individual 
citizens and the dignity of unborn human life, on the other.  
 
Birth control and the legal status of the human embryo 
 
Conflicts between the demands of science, historically evolved cultural values, 
                                                                                                                                                              
point in time, provided clinical use of modified embryos will ever be approved. (See in this regard: 
Rosemann, Jiang and Zhang, accepted).  
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traditions and the particularities of different legal systems have resulted in 
controversies regarding the legal status of human embryos. This is well illustrated in 
China. As we will show, perhaps in part because of the challenges associated with 
regulating abortion, a critical awareness on the use and destruction of human embryos 
and foetuses for research purposes has emerged among regulators and the public. As 
we will illustrate in the subsequent sections, this is reflected in much of the 
commentary that addresses the legal status of human embryos in different legal 
domains in China. Let us first however take a historical view on perspectives of 
abortion in China, and how these have changed over time.  
The late Qing government introduced the idea that abortion was defined as a 
criminal offense (Long 2012). However, before the enforcement of the Qing’s 
criminal law, the Qing government dissolved in 1911. In the newly emerging 
Republic of China abortion was again criminalized. It was allowed only if the 
termination of a pregnancy was induced by a disease or life saving drugs (Long 2012).  
Unless the above applied, abortion was prohibited because the foetus was seen as 
being endowed with ‘human right’（人权） and the right to live（生命）. As the 
ethical scholar Guobing Song suggested in 1933, the foetus ‒ from its starting point as 
a human embryo – has a right to live and is endowed with human rights. Since the 
foetus was defined as a human being, any abortion was considered equal to killing a 
person (Long 2012). Based on this, abortion was ethically identified as intentional 
killing.  
Although the government of the Republic of China prohibited abortion and 
regulated abortion as criminal offense, abortion was still popular due to high 
demand.4  Since abortion was recognized as a crime, doctors who were officially 
licensed were not willing to conduct abortion. Therefore, abortion was typically 
performed secretly in the Republican era. Most of the abortion cases that became 
known to the public were because women died as a result of the procedure (Long 
2012). For these reasons, the number of abortion cases in that period seemed 
relatively low. In Fujian province, for example, the official number of abortion cases 
were only 26 from 1943 to 1947 (Long 2012). Hence, despite abortion constituting a 
criminal offense on paper, it was not strictly enforced. Abortion was not criminalized 
or persecuted in the same way as killing a person would have been. 
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), things 
gradually changed. Along with the country’s growing population, abortion became an 
important part of public policy, closely bound to national interest. Family planning 
was first proposed in the report of 1st Five Year Plan (1953‒57) (Pan 2006).5 Then in 
1972, the Chinese government introduced the “Later, Longer, Fewer” programme to 
reduce the average birth rate (Zhang 2006).6 This campaign recommended smaller 
families by advocating a later age for marriage and birthing, and longer periods 
between births (Shen 1990). In order to increase controls on fertility levels, the 
government introduced in 1980 the “One-Child Policy”, a fundamental national 
                                                        
4 The reason for the big demand may lies in the lack of contraceptive measures at that time (Long 
2012). 
5 The First Five Year Plan was drafted under the direction of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, and aimed to concentrate efforts on the construction of 694 large and medium-sized 
industrial projects to develop agricultural producers’ cooperatives to help in the socialist transformation 
of the agriculture and handicraft industries and to put capitalist industry and commerce on the track of 
state capitalism (Pan 2006). 
6 “Later, longer, fewer” programme means later marriages, longer interval between births, fewer 
children. (See Zhang 2006). 
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policy that prescribed that one couple had one baby only (Shen 1990). Abortion 
became an important tool of population control and had the unique value in reducing 
birth rate (Wang 2006).7 However, regarding abortion, there existed a fundamental 
difference between the two policies: while the “Later, Longer, Fewer” programme 
offered abortion services as a voluntary option, one-child-policy abortion became 
mandatorily enforceable by the state.  
The historical overview above shows that the attitudes towards abortion were 
affected by the policies. The family planning policy required women who underwent 
forced sterilisation or abortion to devalue unborn human life.  In Ankang city, of 
Shanxi province, a woman was forced late-stage abortion in 2012.  The woman was 
given an injection to induce the abortion of her foetus in the seventh month. The 
family planning authority in Shanxi province said it was a serious violation of the 
regulations (Zhang and Sun 2013). The city government urged the county government 
to carry out an in-depth examination and suspended the director of the county’s 
Family Planning Bureau. 8   However, many critics indicated that this and similar 
instances of late-stage abortion were not only related to the liability of administrative 
authorities, but also related to the cultural dehumanization of the human foetus (Zhou 
2012).  
Of interest, in the context of this article, is the fact that the one-child policy has 
not only affected couple’s family planning decisions but also the legal status of 
unborn human life, including the embryo. From the perspective of the population 
policy, unborn human life that exceeded the permitted limits of the policy was no 
longer seen as being endowed with inherent human dignity. 
 
Patent control and the legal status of the human embryo 
 
With the development of biotechnology, the legal status of the human embryo started 
to be challenged and changed. Patent law is a good example to illustrate this point. 
The discovery of human embryonic stem cells, in particular, raised a series of ethical 
and public policy questions. For example, one of the most important patents in the 
stem cell field ‒ the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) patent 
application ‒ reflected the interaction and tensions between morality and patentability 
in different world regions: the WARF invention was granted patent in the USA9, but 
was rejected by the European Union (EU) because of a morality clause.10  Under 
Article 53 of the European Patent Convention, patents shall not be granted to 
inventions that use human embryos for industrial or commercial purpose. The human 
body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and the discovery or 
isolation of its basic parts (such as stem cells), cannot constitute a patentable 
invention (Sterckx 2013). 
Like the EU patent convention, the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Standing Committee 2008) contains a moral exclusion. As laid down in Article 
                                                        
7 Professor Wang Jinying’s research indicated that between 1972 and 2006 between 264 and 320 
million births were prevented as a result of the birth control policy (Wang 2006).  
8  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-06/15/content_15503761.htm 
9 Primate Embryonic Stem Cell, U. S. Patent No.5, 843,780 (filed Jan.18 1996)(issued Dec.1 1998); 
Primate Embryonic Stem Cell, U. S. Patent No.6, 200,806 (filed Jan.26 998)(issued Mar 13 2001); 
Primate Embryonic Stem Cell, U. S. Patent No.7, 029,913 (filed Oct 18,2001)(issued Apr 18,2006) 
10 The application is involved with the destruction of human embryo, which is contrary to the article 
53(a) ‒ European patents shall not be granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of 
which would be contrary to interest public or morality, see G-02/06 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of 
the European Patent Office. 
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5 of the 2010 Guidelines on the Examination of Patents, which was promulgated by 
Order Nr. 55 of the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO 2010), the patent law 
states that “no patent right shall be granted for any invention‒creation that is contrary 
to the laws of the State or social morality or that is detrimental to public interest” 
(SIPO 2010). 11  According to the explanation by the Commission of Legislative 
Affairs (CLA 2010), the ‘social morality’ standard depends on its acceptability by the 
public. If the invention is accepted by the public and by recognized moral standards, it 
may be granted a patent (CLA 2010) (Jiang 2016). 
However, in practice it is not an easy task to determine whether a patent is 
publicly acceptable or not acceptable in China. First, due to the poor level of 
education (He 2016),12 a large amount of people do not have the capability to fully 
understand the invention. Second, patents are still a relatively new system. For most 
people, patents represent advanced technology that could benefit human beings and as 
a result carry an ‘odour of sanctity’.  
In order to clarify the moral issues of human embryo patenting, the Guidelines 
for Patent Examination (that were launched by the State Intellectual Property Office 
of China) examined whether inventions involving human embryos are within the 
scope of Article 5 of patent law (cf. Jiang 2016). First, Article 3.1.2 in part II of 
chapter 1 in the Guidelines states that the use of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes is contrary to social morality and therefore should be excluded 
from patenting (SIPO 2010). Second, Article 9.1.1.1 in Part II of chapter 10 of the 
Guideline states that “both an embryonic stem cell of human beings and a preparation 
method thereof shall not be granted the patent right in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 5” (SIPO 2010). Third, Article 9.1.1.2 in Part II of chapter 10 points out that 
“the human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, including a 
germ cell, an oosperm, an embryo and an entire human body shall not be granted the 
patent right in accordance with the provisions of Article 5.1” (SIPO 2010).  
The above regulation shows that the moral standard in the patent law system is 
relatively high, which prevents the patenting of human embryos or hESC derived 
from human embryos for the reason that it involves destroying human embryos. In a 
patent application by Shanghai Genon Biological Product Co. Ltd. (Genon) 2 
November 1999, referring to the preparation of pre-implantation embryos for 
therapeutic cloning use, the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO 2013) 
rejected the application pursuant to Article 5 (Jiang 2016).13 SIPO rejected the patent 
application for two reasons. The first was the fact that the preparation method of 
Genon was equivalent to human cloning, which falls within the moral exclusion of 
Article 5 (Wu 2013). The second was that the company targeted the use of human 
embryos for industrial and commercial purposes, which was a violation of Article 5 
(Wu 2013). In 2004, Genon appealed to the Patent Review Committee (PRC) arguing 
that its invention would not violate Article 5 of the Patent law (Wu 2013).14 The 
                                                        
11  Part II of Chapter 1 of the Guidelines on the Examination of Patents by the State Intellectual 
Property Office of China further explained that “the connotation of the laws, administrative regulations, 
social morality and public interest is quite broad, which may vary with time and from region to region. 
Sometimes certain restrictions may be added or removed because of enactment and implementation of 
a new law or administrative regulation or amendment to or abolishment of a preceding law or 
administrative regulation. Therefore, the examiner shall pay special attention to this point in 
conducting examination according to Article 5” (SIPO 2010). 
12  According to the seventh national population investigation, 12445 out of every 100000 people had 
in 2016 an undergraduate degree (He 2016).  
13 This case was discussed in greater detail in: Jiang 2016. 
14 The argument includes first that, although the embryo includes human genetic information, it is an 
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committee re-examined the patent application and concluded that the invention was 
unlawful based on Article 5. The reason was that the patent claim does not exclude the 
possibility of the early embryos developing into humans. As the PRC argued, Genon 
had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the embryos could not develop into 
human beings (Wu 2013). 
Based on information from the search engine of the patent re-examination 
board of SIPO, a similar situation occurred in a patent application from the University 
of Pittsburgh in 2008 (the FS14444 re-examination decision) 15  and from Beijing 
University in 2010 (the FS24343 re-examination decision).16 In these cases, although 
neither a legal definition of human embryos nor the scope of industrial or commercial 
use were provided, it is well established that under the Chinese Patent domain, any 
invention related to use human embryo for industrial or commercial use is prohibited 
from patenting as it destroys human embryos, which is contrary to the morality based 
on Article 5 of patent law (Jiang 2016).17 That the human embryo shares the legal 
status of human beings is the reason why destroying human embryos is contrary to 
morality  
 
Civil Law: The first frozen embryo inheritance case ‒ the embryo as an ethical 
object 
 
While within the Chinese Patent domain the human embryo is conferred the legal 
status of human being, this perspective creates problems with the reality of fertility 
clinics. Reproductive centres and in-vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics have to deal with 
large numbers of human embryos that are left over by IVF. Since the birth of the first 
IVF baby in 1978, IVF has been widely practiced. Millions of IVF cycles have 
resulted in a large number of frozen surplus embryos, which are no longer of use to 
couples (who either got a child or gave up IVF treatment) (Tu 2008; Wahlberg 2016). 
It is a big burden for hospitals to maintain these embryos. Many hospitals are facing 
the dilemma of whether to keep or discard frozen embryos that are left over by IVF. 
Some hospitals choose to destroy them. For example, Jiangsu Province’s People’s 
Hospital announced it intends to dispose of nearly 10,000 frozen embryos from 
untraced parents (Beijing Times 2015).  
In 2014, a case concerning the inheritance of frozen embryos sparked off 
widespread debate regarding the legal status of frozen embryos (Zhang, Fan and 
Zhuang 2014). The case referred to an application by two elders, Mr. Shen and his 
wife. They filed a suit to claim the inheritance of four embryos left by their son in 
November 2013. The context of this case is that Mr. Shen’s son and daughter-in-law 
used IVF at an infertility hospital in Nanjing. However, the young couple died in a car 
                                                                                                                                                              
human-animal hybrid, not a human embryo. Thus, the invention is not related to the industrial or 
commercial use of a human embryo. Second, the embryo created by this method has no possibility of 
becoming human because claims 1-10 of the application contain no human-cloning steps. Third, the 
invention represents one aspect of human organ transplantation technology. Therefore, the invention is 
properly classified as therapeutic cloning. Neither its aim nor its method involves human cloning. In 
conclusion, the invention is not against the law, social morality or the public interest. (Wu 2013). 
15 See the FS14444 re-examination decision by the patent review committee.  (In Chinese). 
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out1110/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=FS14444&lx=fs, 
accessed 23 January 2017. 
16 See the FS24343 re-examination decision by the patent review committee.  (In Chinese). 
http://app.sipo-reexam.gov.cn/reexam_out1110/searchdoc/decidedetail.jsp?jdh=FS24343&lx=fs, 
accessed 23 January 2017.  
17 This case was discussed in greater detail in: Jiang 2016 
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accident before implantation. The husband and wife were both the only child in their 
respective families. Four embryos from the young couple were created in the 
infertility clinic, and were frozen in liquid nitrogen at the time of the couple’s death. 
The parents of both children wanted to inherit these embryos. As a mutually agreeable 
compromise could not be found between the two families, Mr. Shen and his wife 
chose to sue their in-laws (Zhang, Fan and Zhuang 2014). Interestingly, this case 
revealed that the current Chinese legal framework left a vacuum regarding the legal 
status of the human embryo. Frozen embryos were treated through the legal category 
of an “ethical object” (伦理物)  instead of a “human being”. The ethical object is 
different from a common object in civil law. While an “ethical object” requires a 
certain level of consideration and protection in civil law, the application of this 
category to the human embryo was unprecedented. This resulted in a legal conflict 
and different rulings of the lower and higher court in Jiangsu province. In May 2014, 
the Yi Xing court in the Chinese province of Jiangsu ruled that the frozen embryos 
could not be inherited by the dead couple’s parents. For one thing, the hospital which 
had provided the IVF treatment (and which was later added as a third party by the 
judge in this case) declined to hand over the frozen embryo to either party in the 
dispute. For another thing, the court held that frozen embryos created by IVF have the 
potential to develop into a human being, which should be identified as a special thing 
(ibid.). Therefore, in their capacity as “ethical objects” these frozen embryos cannot 
be transferred or inherited as property. The frozen embryo, from the viewpoint of the 
court, can only be used for reproductive purposes by its biological originators. Since 
the young couple had died and surrogate birth is illegal in China, the reproductive 
purpose of the four frozen embryos can no longer fulfilled (ibid.). 
Mr. Shen and his wife appealed to the higher court. The intermediate People’s 
Court of Wuxi City dismissed the verdict of the lower court and ruled, in September 
2014, that the four frozen embryos could be taken under the custody of the dead 
couple’s parents. The court concluded that no regulation governed the question of the 
moral status of the human embryo. Hence, the court held that three important factors 
should be weighed in respect of the ownership of frozen embryos (Shi, Zhang and 
Zhuang 2014). First, the frozen embryo from IVF contains the unique genetic 
information of the young couple’s families. The parents of the young couple are 
intensely connected to the frozen embryos by consanguinity. Second, the death of the 
young couple was a huge blow to their families and the four embryos became a source 
of hope for the continuation of their children’s life and comfort. Indeed, the potential 
of frozen embryos could heal the parents from the pain of losing their children. Third, 
like the lower court, the appeal court held that the frozen embryo is recognized as an 
“ethical object”, which requires a higher level of moral respect than property. The 
frozen embryos should be valued and protected by people who have the closest 
relationship with them. Since the young couple died in a car accident, their parents 
should be allowed to arrange for the fate of those embryos (ibid.). Respectfully, based 
on the above analysis, the intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi City finally ruled that 
the parents of the young couple could inherit the four frozen embryos. 
It is noteworthy that both the lower court and the higher court recognized the 
frozen embryo as an “ethical object”, which is different from the legal categories 
“special thing” or “mere material property” as it has the potential to develop into a 
human being (Yang 2014).18 However, the lower court ruled that the “ethical object”, 
                                                        
18 This distinction of the court was based on the work of the legal scholar Yang Lixin, who divided 
things into three groups: (1) the ethical thing, (2) the special thing and (3) property, in which the ethical 
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in the case of a frozen embryo, cannot be transferred or inherited, while the higher 
court ruled that it could be inherited (Sun 2015). Despite the fact that the two courts 
recognized the frozen embryos as “ethical objects”, the ownership and transferability 
of human embryos between family members has not been clarified in law. This is 
reflected by the fact that the embryos could either be inherited or not be inherited 
depending on a different court’s decision. From this perspective, the recognition of 
human embryos as “ethical objects” seems meaningless and insufficient. To make 
matters worse, no specific ethical rules have yet been provided for the legal category 
“ethical object”.  
Nevertheless, the court case related to the inheritance of the four frozen 
embryos case had public repercussions. The China Central Television broadcasted 
this case in several programs. The case was also selected as one of the ten biggest 
civil cases in China in 2014. Some commented the decision indicated the success of 
ethics and family relationship (Yang 2015). The intermediate court determined that 
the human embryo is to be classified as “an ethical object” which deserves special 
protection. But the court provided no direct reference to whether these frozen human 
embryos were to be seen as human beings or as property. As an alternative, the court 
used the principle of “ethical care” and “family relationship” to rule that frozen 
embryos could be inherited by the family. The court contended that to let the family 
rather than the state deal with the frozen embryos is in the best interest of the frozen 
embryos, since close family members have a more intimate relationship with them. 
The decision shows, to some extent, that the legal system in China is increasingly 
paying attention to humanistic care. 
 
Discussion   
 
These findings suggest that definitions of the legal status of the human embryo in 
China are at present in the midst of a renegotiation process and subject to changes. 
The different legal domains discussed in this paper do not only create ambiguity over 
the embryo as a legal and moral object, but they also create a problem space for 
embryos that allows their status to be discussed and redefined. In these different 
domains and in relation to different types of technologies (IVF, embryo freezing, stem 
cell research and abortion) the embryo emerges as a sort of layered boundary object. 
These multi-layered conceptions are influenced and changed furthermore by the 
recent softening of the one-child policy and other cultural and political changes. 
In which ways are the divergent notions of the embryo influenced by wider 
socio-political factors and China’s ambition to establish itself as a leading global 
player in science and technology research? As Sheila Jasanoff observed, different 
societies take on different ethical and legal models when taking decisions involving 
science and technology (Jasanoff 2005). The rise of a biopolitical sphere and life 
science economy in China offers unique insights about the change of the legal status 
of human embryos (Adams et al 2010). The uncertain legal status of the human 
embryo serves the rapidly changing politics of China: from the Maoist revolution to 
the current efforts to build a socialist political economy. The uncertain legal status of 
the human embryo serves the specific aims and relationships that maintain the social 
and political ambitions of these changing politics in China (Thomson 2010). 
We suggest that the ongoing changes of the embryo’s legal and moral status 
                                                                                                                                                              




are shaped by various developments and causes. A first, more general, point is that 
new technological uses of human embryos, foetuses or gametes (in the context of 
novel types of research and technology applications) create specific sets of moral, 
social, legal and political challenges. The surfacing of CRISPR-based embryo gene 
editing, for instance, has given rise to different questions and dilemmas than those 
related to human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research or, previously, the invention of 
human reproductive IVF. Each of these technologies has necessitated a 
reconsideration of the ontological, moral and social status of embryos, which in turn 
has influenced legal and regulatory debates on the embryo’s status.  
Another element is the existence of a political and social climate in China that 
has emphasized rapid economic growth and scientific progress for many years. There 
are three push factors in particular which have propelled research with human 
embryos and other reproductive tissues in the last fifteen years or so in China: (i) the 
prospect of new economic opportunities and profits; (ii) the promise of medical 
progress; and (iii) the realization of new techno-scientific advances. As a rapidly 
developing country that aims to solve its internal social problems and to successfully 
compete with high-income countries, China has often pursued a more “pragmatic” 
and at times “aggressive” development model. The existence of too many safeguards 
and too much regulation has often been seen as “suffocating” economic and techno-
scientific progress rather than promoting it, although the risks for China’s citizens 
have at times increased as a result (Bound et al, 2013). Human embryo genome 
editing, and previously hESC research, promises significant advances in all three of 
these areas. This is why investment and research in these fields have been strongly 
endorsed by many in China and many other countries. These push factors have a 
strongly legitimizing effect on research with human embryos, and they play an 
important role in shaping the debates through which legal conceptions of human 
embryos are defined and revised. In the case of human embryo and germ line gene 
editing, we still see another at present less influential push factor: discourses that 
stress potential advantages of human enhancement (beyond purely medical 
interventions). Although highly controversial and still far off in technical terms, the 
genetic modification of human beings for enhancement purposes is associated by 
many with benefits. Proponents for genetic modification of humans beyond the 
medical realm can be found in both Western countries and China (Savulescu et al 
2015). 
Of interest, in this regard, is the fact that each of these three factors is 
associated with very specific conceptions of social benefits. Like in many other 
countries, for the government and stakeholders in China, biotechnology is not merely 
about economic profits, but related to national security and the management of a risky 
future, such as food security and environmental preservation (Ong 2010). Moreover, 
the realization of these benefits is often portrayed as a compelling moral imperative. 
The opening up of new economic possibilities, profits and sectors is seen as a key 
driver for long-term economic development in China, which in turn is a precondition 
to guarantee social stability, employment and the well-being of citizens. Medical 
progress, on the other hand, promises new treatments and better health care. It also 
improves the health of China’s population at a higher level. Advances in hESC, pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and now human genome editing, give new 
hope for the cure (or prevention) of previously incurable diseases. This involves also 
the reduction of births resulting in serious disabilities or birth defects, which 
continues to be an important goal in China’s population politics. The realization of 
new techno-scientific breakthroughs, in turn, lies at the core of realizing the transition 
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of China from a production-based model of economic development to an innovation 
society. As China’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016‒20) has once again clarified, the aim is 
to compete globally at the cutting edge of science and technology research. 
Investments in stem cell and genetics research have been announced as key 
investment areas (Cyranoski 2015). CRISPR research has especially been encouraged 
by the Chinese Government. Fifty-seven programmes involving CRISPR research had, 
by October 2016, been approved and funded by the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China. The total funding of these programmes is more than 31 million 
RMB (Biological Discovery Network 2015). But investments into human gene editing 
research, including CRISPR-based research with human embryos, have also been 
made by the private sector. Professor Junjiu Huang, the principal investigator of the 
first-ever published human embryo gene editing article, reportedly received three 
million RMB of research funds from a private company called JinJia Group (Yang 
2015). 
Another factor that has influenced discourses and debates on the legal status of 
the human embryo is China’s population politics. More than three decades of the one-
child policy (which in 2015 was transformed to a two-child policy) have had an effect 
on attitudes towards abortion. While the moral imperative of the policy was to 
promote the well-being of China’s huge population as a whole (by protecting the 
country from over-population and potentially chaos, famine and social unrest), 35 
years of population control have left a mark: the policy defined embryos and foetuses 
as removable entities that could be aborted, discarded or used for research without 
much moral scruples or consideration (Greenhalgh and Winkler 2007); regardless of 
the views of the women, couples and families that were affected by the policy (Nie 
2005). In legal terms, the continuity of unborn babies of families who already have 
one child (since January 1 2012, two children) was transferred from the parents to the 
state, which has the right to insist on pregnancy termination and to execute sanctions 
if people resist the policy.  
It is difficult to say, though, exactly in which ways the socio-cultural impact of 
the one-child policy has influenced debates on the legal status of human embryos. 
One has to be extremely careful not to overestimate the impact of China’s population 
politics or to misinterpret conceptions of the low status of unborn human life in the 
context of the population policy as being representative for the perceptions of Chinese 
citizens and scientists at a general level. As various studies have shown, assumptions 
that human embryos and foetuses are generally seen as being of low value in Chinese 
society due to the high numbers of abortions in the context of the population policy 
(Mann 2003; Cookson 2005) have proven wrong (Rosemann and Luo, under review). 
Research among Chinese IVF patients, students and women’s groups, for example, 
has shown that the perceptions and ascribed value of human embryos are diversified 
and complex in China and that for many people the donation of human embryos for 
research or commercial purposes is unthinkable (Jin et al. 2013; Rosemann and Luo, 
under review). This body of research has illustrated that human embryos and foetuses 
in China are embedded in a complex and at times conflicting web of cultural 
meanings, values, emotions and social relations. As numerous commentators have 
pointed out, these perceptions often stand in stark contrast with conceptions of the 
“low status” of unborn human life in the context of the one-child policy (Sleeboom-
Faulkner 2014; Hu 2009; Rosemann and Luo, under review). This line of research has 
also illustrated that many of the conceptions and values through which IVF patients 
make sense of their embryos or eggs are grounded in cultural traditions, folk beliefs 
and the social norms of rural culture. They often represent a highly prudent and 
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conservative view on the transfer or sale of human embryos (and other human tissues 
such as blood or organs) to others and to their use in research (Jin et al 2013; 
Rosemann and Luo, under review). As our empirical data suggest, these culturally 
mediated conceptions of morality and social norms also play a role in the ongoing 
renegotiation process regarding the embryo’s legal status.   
 
Three lines of controversy that underlie the re-negotiation of the embryo’s legal 
status 
 
Our findings suggest that the current renegotiation of the legal status of unborn human 
life in divergent domains of China’s legal system reveals a set of controversies and 
contradictions that unfold along three dimensions. The first of these is a conflict 
between conceptions of morality that prioritize the realization of collective benefits 
and interests versus the protection of individual interests and rights. As Aihwa Ong 
highlighted the complex ethical dilemmas of the life sciences in China, Singapore, 
South Korea and other Asia countries, biotechnology seem to be a necessary tool for 
defining and solving problems of collective interests (Ong 2010). As China shifts 
from a manufacture-based economy to a knowledge-based economy, biotechnology 
refers to the fate of the wider community and national power. Biotechnology is no 
longer a purely technical context, but is closely enmeshed with cultural beliefs and 
conceptions of a common future. Conceptions of collective morality are embedded in 
the aforementioned push factors of long-term economic development, improved 
health, scientific advances and the prevention of over-population. Each of these goals 
is related to social stability and the well-being of China’s society as a whole. This 
collective orientation conflicts, however, with the protection of the interests and rights 
of individual citizens (and human embryos and foetuses themselves). While this clash 
is most apparent in the context of the population policy, in patent law and civil law the 
protection of individual interests is increasingly acknowledged. Both, the biological 
originators and human embryos themselves are seen as requiring special protection, 
and are granted rights that prevent commodification or unwanted destruction. The 
protection of individual citizens (especially IVF patients) is also reflected in the 
artificial reproduction technology (ART) law and the regulation of hESC research. 
These are based on the bioethical principles of autonomy, informed consent, the right 
to refuse embryo (or gamete) donation, and the recognition of IVF patients as the 
legal owner of human embryos and gametes (Cheng et al. 2006). 
A second dimension that has influenced the re-articulation of the embryo’s 
legal status is a clash between the striving to establish China as a modern innovation 
society and global economic powerhouse and attempts to shape the acceptable limits 
of this process. This is most clearly reflected in the discourse surrounding the 
prohibition to commodify and patent human embryos and corresponding derivates 
(such as hESC or genetically modified embryos or germ cells). As the 2010 
Guidelines for Patent Examination state in its moral exclusion clause, “no patent right 
shall be granted for any invention‒creation that is contrary to … social morality or 
that is detrimental to public interest” (SIPO 2010). It is clear that from a purely 
economic perspective the patenting of hESC or other reproductive tissues can be 
beneficial. In the USA, for instance, the patenting of hESC and other human tissues is 
permitted and seen as a prerequisite to secure profits in this research field (Matthews 
and Cuchiara 2014). According to the Chinese patent system, however, the use of the 
‘human body at various stages of its formation and development, including [as] a 
germ cell, an embryo and an entire human body’ for industrial and commercial 
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purposes is seen as contrary to social morality and has, as a result, been excluded 
from patenting (SIPO 2010; Article 9.1.1). This decision is part of a wider critical 
discourse that problematizes the commodification of human tissues and body parts in 
China, and sees it as detrimental to public interests and socialist modernization (SIPO 
2010; Article 3.1.2).  
A third area of contention, which is closely related to the previous one, is a 
clash between more “traditional” values and social norms, and the “modernist” ethos 
of techno-scientific progress that plays an important role in China. This is well 
illustrated in the moral discourse surrounding the use of human embryos for hESC 
research. A “modernist” ethos is represented in most of the scientific, policy and even 
bioethical discourse on the issue. While it is widely acknowledged that the human 
embryo (and the donors of human embryos) require special protection, its use for 
research purposes is legitimized because hESCs ‘have the potential to cure millions of 
patients’ (Qiu 2007). In this order of discourse, moral and ontological conceptions of 
the embryo usually classify it as a “de-personalized” and “unspiritual” form of 
biological matter, which is full of promissory value but devoid of religious, cultural or 
social meanings and value (Yang 2003; Cong 2008). This often stands in contrast, 
however, with the viewpoints and perceptions of ordinary citizens in China. As 
mentioned above, various empirical studies have shown that among IVF patients the 
use and destruction of embryos for research are often highly contested (Jin et al. 2013; 
Rosemann and Luo, under review). Reasons that have been cited are (i) that IVF 
couples see their surplus embryos as potential children which are part of the family 
and ancestral line, (ii) emotional attachment to these embryos and corresponding 
moral conflicts, (iii) resistance to embryo donation due to religious concerns, (iv) the 
rejection of the idea that donated embryos shall be used for the generation of profits, 
and (v) the existence of “feudal thoughts” and “folk beliefs” that prohibit the donation 
of body parts to anyone outside the family and blood line (Hu 2009; Mitzkat, Haimes 
and Rehmann Sutter 2010; Jin et al. 2013; Sleeboom-Faulkner 2014; Rosemann and 
Luo, under review). In current debates on the legal status of the embryo, these moral 
concerns are now gradually acknowledged in China. They are reflected, for instance, 
in the morality clause of patent law, and in the decision that the patenting and 
commodification of human reproductive (and other human) tissues is contrary to 
conceptions of public morality and social order. The subjective value of embryos are 
also reflected in the above-mentioned civil law case, where the emotional significance 
of the inherited frozen IVF embryos for the grandparents has been acknowledged, and 
used as the basis to reverse the decision of the lower court. However, because public 
debate and deliberation on the use of human embryos for hESC and more recently 
human gamete and embryo gene editing have so far occurred on a small scale in 
China, the viewpoints of citizens have often been under-represented or been absent in 




In this paper we set out to examine processes of ethical deliberation, legislative 
developments, and a variety of social and political factors that have contributed to the 
emergence of human embryo gene editing as a field of life science research in China. 
For this purpose we have conducted an analysis of legislative developments in three 
domains of China’s legal system: patent law, the jurisdictional domain of birth control, 
and civil law. As we have shown, in each of these domains the legal status of human 
embryos is defined differently. Moreover, definitions of the legal status of embryos 
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are subject to ongoing contestation and changes in patent and civil law. To explain 
these changes, we have examined a variety of social and political factors that have 
influenced legal debates on the embryo in China. We have suggested that the 
dilemmas that result from the emergence of new ways of using human embryos in 
research, together with the existence of conflicting social aspirations and moral values, 
have resulted in a continuing renegotiation process of the embryo’s legal status in 
China. As we have illustrated, this process is driven in particular by three areas of 
contention. First, contrasting conceptions of morality prioritize the achievement of 
collective benefits (at the level of China’s society at a larger level) and the protection 
of individual rights and interests (at the level of both embryo donors and the moral 
status of human embryos themselves). A second area of contention that has influenced 
legal definitions of embryos, in particular in patent law, is a conflict between the 
move toward rapid economic and technology modernization and initiatives to shape 
acceptable limits of this process. This has been expressed most clearly in the 
prohibition of the capitalization of human reproductive tissues and body parts, which 
is seen as detrimental to public morality and order. A third and closely related point is 
a clash between values and social norms that are grounded in China’s cultural 
“traditions” and the more “modernist” ethos of radical scientific progress. 
As we have documented, conceptions of the human embryo as a “de-
personalized” and “unspiritual” biological entity in policy and law do frequently 
conflict with the perceptions of individual citizens, who perceive human embryos 
through a plethora of personalized meanings and emotions, intergenerational 
obligations as well as religious and folk beliefs. The ultimate outcomes of the tensions 
that have evolved in these three areas are at present not clear, but with further 
developments in human germ line gene editing, additional changes and conflicts 
regarding definitions of the embryo’s legal and moral status can be expected. 
An unresolved question is, whether the divergent and conflicting definitions of 
the embryo’s legal status (in the three legal domains that we have described) have 
themselves been a factor that accounts for the fact that Chinese researchers have 
adopted human embryo gene editing research more than a year before researchers in 
other countries. This question is extremely difficult to answer. While it is true that the 
one-child policy has for more than three decades devalued unborn human life, it is 
also true that claims that the value of human embryos and reproductive tissues 
foetuses in China is generally regarded low (as a result of the policy) cannot be 
maintained. As mentioned by Nie, the Chinese birth politics may have facilitated 
access to aborted embryonic and foetal tissue for research and therapeutic purposes 
(Nie 2005), but with the advent of hESC the donation and use of human embryos has 
become subject to various safeguards that involve informed consent, IRB review and 
the prohibition to commodify human reproductive tissues. Nevertheless, the 
normalization of pregnancy termination and the existence of a more secular and 
utilitarian view of in-vitro fertilized embryos and aborted embryos, at least among 
many scientists, clinicians and in formal political discourse, may well have supported 
the rapid move ahead in human embryo gene editing. In order to arrive at a more 
consistent answer to this question, further research will be required that examines the 
perceptions, considerations and actions of scientists who operate in this field. 
Research will be required, in particular, into interactions and possible conflicts 
between scientists and the legal system, processes of embryo and gamete donation as 
well as regulatory approval practices for human embryo gene editing research.  
We end this article with three lines of considerations that might structure 
future studies on this issue. First, scientists are usually well aware of the kinds of 
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incentives that compliance with legal rules creates. If scientists can choose from 
multiple legal or regulatory options, or they can exploit regulatory loopholes without 
serious sanctions, they may make use of these possibilities and sometimes completely 
avoid compliance with regulatory guidelines or the law (Raz 1972). At a more general 
level, law should strive to provide certainty and balance reliability against flexibility, 
in order to facilitate consistent and predictable applications. The uncertainties and 
multiple definitions of the legal status of human embryos in China’s legal system, it 
seems to us, facilitate the selection of different kinds of legal definitions, and in 
particular those on whose basis the use and genetic modification is easily justified. By 
being able to treat and procure human embryos as disposable biological entities, 
whose use in research has potentially wide-ranging social benefits, approval for 
research in the context of local IRBs may be easier than in other countries in whose 
legal system the human embryo has been ascribed the status of a “human being”.  
While it is true, as Zhai, Ng and Lie (2016) have pointed out, that current 
regulatory guidelines for human germ line gene editing are comparable to regulatory 
instruments in other countries, these rules do not yet adequately address the potential 
social implications of this research and the legal and moral dilemmas that are likely to 
result from it. It is important to point out in this regard, that the legal and regulatory 
tools that guide human germ line research in China today take a relatively narrow 
ethical view on this emerging research field. Principles such as informed consent, 
autonomy and ethical review focus in most respects on the protection of scientists and 
the donors of human embryos. This rather “narrow” regulatory approach seems to 
ignore the broader societal implications of human embryo gene editing research, 
including the challenges to systematically govern this technology field across China’s 
large territory and thousands of medical institutions.  
A second line of consideration is the strong financial stakes that underlie gene-
editing research, including human germ line gene-editing research. Considering the 
widespread investments that can currently be observed in this research field, the 
issuing of clear and robust regulation seems crucial. This must also involve a 
consistent conception of the legal status of human gametes and embryos in China and 
other countries. An important question in this respect is whether the prospect of new 
investments and, some way down the line, the generation of financial profits may 
actually disincentivise the adoption, implementation and use of coherent regulatory 
and legal frameworks in this research field. As the case of clinical stem cell research 
has shown, legal and regulatory uncertainties can be an important factor in attracting 
investments. Investors may read the existence of lenient or minimal regulation as a 
sign that scientists and governments prioritize rapid technology developments and 
corresponding applications above the implementation of consistent and more stringent 
regulatory rules, which may increase research expenses and delay possible forms of 
applications. In other words, the nature of research competition in the CRISPR field 
may generate a dynamic that may loosen the tenets of cautious rationalism and give 
rise to premature and not systematically thought through real-world applications, with 
potentially harmful effects. The uncertain and contested legal status of human 
embryos in China is likely to add fuel to the fire of this “gene editing rush” and to 
expedite the booming of CRISPR human applications.  
A final line of consideration is that the cost of legal uncertainty may decrease 
public involvement in the design and implementation of public policy. The uncertain 
and contested legal status of the human embryo can render the public confused. This 
may result in ambiguities about the exact definitions that are handled in different 
regulatory domains, which in turn makes is more difficult to address the problems 
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caused by biotechnology progress such as hESC research and CRISPR gene editing. 
Public awareness and confusion regarding the regulation of medical technologies 
have in recent years been highlighted by broadening mass media coverage of medical 
and legal controversies. In the light of these reports, many scientists and policy 
makers fear that the engagement of the public may hinder research progress. Often 
heard reasons, as exemplified by the case of hESC research, are that citizens are likely 
to be insufficiently informed or to misunderstand the purposes of science, and 
alternatively that their concerns may slow down the research process as well as the 
articulation and issuing of policies and regulatory frameworks. These arguments 
should not be taken for granted and further research into the public perceptions of 
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